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Abstract—We study secure source-coding with causal disclo-
sure, under the Gaussian distribution. The optimality of Gaus-
sian auxiliary random variables is shown in various scenarios.
We explicitly characterize the tradeoff between the rates of
communication and secret key. This tradeoff is the result of a
mutual information optimization under Markov constraints. As
a corollary, we deduce a general formula for Wyner’s Common
Information in the Gaussian setting.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing body of work in secure source coding
[1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]. Most of the problem formulations
consider distortion at the legitimate receiver and equivocation
at the eavesdropper. An alternative approach was proposed by
Yamamoto [8], [9] which replaced the eavesdropper’s equivo-
cation with the distortion incurred by the eavesdropper’s best
estimate of the information source. The motivation behind this
formulation is a purely operational approach to the problem
of secrecy. The choice of distortion function may depend on
the context in which secrecy is desired.
Recently, the problem posed by Yamamoto was solved [10]
and considerably generalized [6], [7], [11]. The salient feature
of the new approach is the causal disclosure of information
to the eavesdropper. There are compelling arguments that
this disclosure is necessary for a robust notion of secure
communication [7]. This formulation of secrecy is natural
when understood in a game-theoretic context. A repeated game
is being played by the adversary versus the communication
system. Distortion is replaced by a payoff function, while the
information sequences equate to actions of the players.
Remarkably, when the payoff is chosen to be the log-loss
function [12], the above framework recovers results for (nor-
malized) equivocation-based secrecy [13]. Under this choice of
payoff, the adversary expresses her belief about the distribution
of the current information symbol, given her knowledge of
past symbols. Thus, the secure source coding framework of
[7] generalizes traditional approaches to secrecy. We note that
with this generality, new challenges arise in certain contexts
involving uncoded side information at the receiver [14], [15],
[16].
Now, we recall the main result of [7] derived under this
framework: The optimal tradeoff between communication rate
R, secret key rate R0 and average payoff Π is given by the
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Fig. 1. The causal disclosure framework for secure source coding [7].
Disclosures D = (Dx, Dy) are allowed, with arbitrary orthogonal
disclosure channels PDx,Dy|XY = PDx|XPDy |Y .
union of regions
R ≥ I(X ;U, V ), (1)
R0 ≥ I(Dx, Dy;V |U), (2)
Π ≤ min
z(·)
E[pi(X,Y, z(U))], (3)
where the union is taken over distributions that enforce the
Markov chain Dx − X − (U, V ) − Y − Dy . Though the
presentation in [7] restricts itself to the case when all random
variables have finite alphabets, most of the results (lossless
communication is an exception) easily generalize to continu-
ous random variables.
The scheme used to obtain the above region admits a
simple interpretation. The information source Xn is split into
two parts: a secure part V n and a non-secure part Un. The
eavesdropper is given full knowledge of Un, while the secret
key is focused on keeping V n perfectly secure. This can be
implemented using a superposition code [7].
Unlike V , the variable U plays a specific and concrete role
in the secure communication system as the information that
is leaked to the eavesdropper, discussed in [7, Section VI-F].
That is, the significance of the distribution of U is more than
simply that of an optimization parameter for the region (1)-(3).
This paper asks the following question: Given that PX,Y,U is
Gaussian (this fixes the bound on Π), can the communication-
key tradeoff be realized with Gaussian PV |X,Y,U? Our primary
motivation for this investigation is a potential application to
the problem of secure rate-limited control. In the context of
control, Y n may be a Gaussian control signal that is correlated
with the state process Xn, and Un is a Gaussian degradation
of the control that is leaked to the eavesdropper.
Classical control theory [17] provides exact characteriza-
tions of control performance for Gauss-Markov processes. If
the relevant rates are optimized by Gaussian distributions,
then we can replace rate-limited feedback links with idealized
Gaussian channels and use these characterizations to derive
tight bounds on performance. This observation has already
been used by Tatikonda-Mitter-Sahai [18], [19] to characterize
optimal performance in rate-limited control with quadratic
costs.
It is worth pointing out that if the optimization is carried
out jointly over (U, V ) satisfying the Markov constraint, then
Gaussian PU,V |X,Y does not suffice to achieve the entire
rate-payoff region even when pi(·, ·, ·) is a quadratic func-
tion [20]. However, the Gaussianity of U is motivated by
operational considerations derived from the coding scheme
described above. Since Un represents information that is
revealed to the eavesdropper, this is conveniently modeled in
many applications by a linear/additive channel from Xn or
Y n to Un. Such degradations can be often be realized by
physical processes (e.g. optical, electrical). Further theoretical
justification is provided by the worst-additive-noise-lemma
[21], [22] when the payoff is pointwise mutual information
pi(y, z) = − log p(y)p(z)p(y,z) .
Besides the potential application to secure control, the
problem we consider is interesting in its own right as a mutual
information optimization under unusual Markov constraints.
There has been much effort in the information theory com-
munity focused on proving optimality of Gaussian random
variables for various applications [21], [22], [23]. We remark
that recent techniques [23] designed to prove the optimality
of Gaussian auxiliaries seem to be best suited to cases where
the optimization is over random variables at the extremes of
Markov chains [24]. It is unclear if the method can be adapted
to our setting, where the optimization is over an auxiliary in
the middle of a Markov chain.
Our approach will be a strengthening of the estimation-
theoretic technique used to compute the common information
of a bivariate Gaussian distribution in [25] (the result first
appeared in [26], but the proof had a gap that was later
corrected). As a corollary, we deduce a general formula for
Wyner’s common information in the Gaussian setting. This
quantity has proved to be fundamental in various source coding
problems [25], [27], [28], [29], [30], although most of these
results consider sources with a finite alphabet.
II. NOTATION
We represent both random variables and probability distri-
bution functions with capital letters, but only letters P and
Q are used for the latter. The set of real numbers is denoted
by R, while R+ denotes non-negative reals. We denote the
conditional distribution of the random variable Y given the
random variable X by PY |X(y|x). This is the usual notation,
although sometimes we do abbreviate it as PY |X . Markov
chains are denoted by X − Y − Z implying the factorization
PX,Y,Z = PX,Y PZ|Y while X ⊥ Y indicates that the random
variables X and Y are independent. Sequences of random
variables X1, . . . , Xn are denoted by Xn.
Let diag({ai}ri=1) ∈ Rr×r denote a diagonal matrix A
with diagonal entries Aii = ai. The transpose of a matrix
A is denoted by AT and A−T = (A−1)T . If X ∈ Rd is a
d-dimensional (column) vector, then X:i denotes the vector
formed by the first i components of X .
We denote the covariance matrix of zero-mean random
vectors X ∈ Rd by ΣX := E[XXT ] ∈ Rd×d. When d = 1,
we set σ2X := ΣX . For zero-mean random vectors X,Y ∈ Rd,
the cross-covariance matrix is denoted by ΣXY := E[XY T ] ∈
R
d×d
. Note that ΣXY = ΣTYX .
Recall that ΣX is real, symmetric and positive semi-definite.
Its eigen-decomposition is given by ΣX = BXΛBTX . Let
rX := rank(ΣX). We set Σ1/2X = BXΛ1/2BTX and Σ
−1/2
X =
BXΛ
−1/2BTX , with
Λ−1/2 =
(
Λ
−1/2
+ 0
0 0
)
, (4)
where Λ+ ∈ RrX×rX is the submatrix of Λ with strictly
positive diagonal entries. Note that we have
Σ
−1/2
X ΣXΣ
−1/2
X =
(
Ir 0
0 0
)
, (5)
where Ir ∈ Rr×r is the identity matrix.
III. MAIN RESULT
In the following, we assume that X,Y, U ∈ Rd are jointly
Gaussian random vectors. There is no loss of generality in
assuming the same length for all vectors since we can zero-
pad shorter vectors. For simplicity, we restrict to disclosures
Dx ∈ {∅, X} and Dy ∈ {∅, Y }.
Theorem 1. For jointly Gaussian X,Y, U ∈ Rd, the region (1)-
(3) is optimized by Gaussian PV |XUY , such that X−(U, V )−
Y holds. In particular, we have the following communication-
key tradeoffs:
• Arbitrary PDx|X and Dy = ∅:
R ≥ I(X ;U, Y ), (6)
R0 ≥ I(Dx;Y |U), (7)
• Dx = ∅, Dy = Y :
R ≥
1
2
d∑
i=1
EU
[
log
1
(1 − ρ2XU,i)(1 − a
U
λ,i)
]
, (8)
R0 ≥
1
2
d∑
i=1
EU

log 1(
1−
ρ2
XY |U,i
aU
λ,i
)

, (9)
with
aUλ,i =
(λ − 1)ρ2XY |U,i +
√
4λρ2i + (1− λ)
2ρ4XY |U,i
2λ
,
(10)
• Dx = X,Dy = Y :
R ≥
1
2
d∑
i=1
EU
[
log
1
(1− ρ2XU,i)(1 − a
U
λ,i)
]
, (11)
R0 ≥
1
2
d∑
i=1
EU

log 1− ρ
2
XY |U,i
(1− aUλ,i)
(
1−
ρ2
XY |U,i
aU
λ,i
)

, (12)
with
aUλ,i =
λρ2XY |U,i + ρXY |U,i
√
λ2ρ2XY |U,i + 4(λ+ 1)
2(λ+ 1)
,
(13)
where {ρXU,i}di=1 are singular values of Σ
−1/2
X ΣXUΣ
−1/2
U ,{
ρXY |U,i
}d
i=1
are singular values of Σ−1/2X|U ΣXY |UΣ
−1/2
Y |U and
the tradeoffs are parametrized by λ ∈ [0,∞).
A. Interpretation
The parameter λ specifies the (R,R0) point that is tangent
to a supporting line with slope −λ−1. Equations (10) and (13)
precisely capture the path traced by the optimizing channels
PX|U,V and PY |U,V as the line is varied. Note that the first
case (Dy = ∅) immediately follows from the data-processing
inequality.
The above results are expressed in terms of the singular
values of the correlation matrix ρXY := Σ−1/2X ΣXY Σ
−1/2
Y .
Recall that the linear MMSE estimator is given in terms of
this matrix (for zero-mean random variables) as
E[X |Y ] = Σ
1/2
X ρXY Σ
−1/2
Y Y. (14)
In the scalar case, this simplifies to
E[X |Y ] = ρXY
σX
σY
Y, (15)
where ρXY is the correlation coefficient.
We also generalize a result of [25], which considered the
case of scalar Gaussian random variables.
Corollary 1. For jointly Gaussian X,Y ∈ Rd, Wyner’s
common information is given by
C(X ;Y ) := min
U :X−U−Y
I(X,Y ;U) =
1
2
d∑
i=1
log
1 + ρi
1− ρi
,
(16)
where {ρi}di=1 are singular values of Σ
−1/2
X ΣXY Σ
−T/2
Y .
In the following sections, we only present the proof for
(Dx, Dy) = (X,Y ). The proof for the second case is similar
and thus, omitted.
IV. PROOF
Note that the communication rate I(X ;U, V ) is minimized
by V = Y , while the secret key rate I(X,Y ;V |U) is
minimized by choosing V such that I(X,Y ;V |U = u) =
C(X ;Y |U = u) for every U = u. In general, it is not possible
to minimize both rates simultaneously.
We consider the optimal frontier of rates by considering the
point at which a supporting hyperplane touches the region. In
other words, we would like to show that
argmin
PV |XUY :X−(U,V )−Y
(λI(X ;U, V ) + I(X,Y ;V |U)) (17)
is minimized by a Gaussian distribution for λ ≥ 0. We shall
constructively show that a minimizer exists, so the above
expression is well-defined. In the following, we shall perform
the analysis conditioned on U , so it suffices to consider the
problem
argmin
PV |X,Y :X−V−Y
(λI(X ;V ) + I(X,Y ;V )). (18)
Since PX,Y is Gaussian, linear-Gaussian PV |X,Y ensures
that the joint distribution is Gaussian as well. Note that the
Gaussianity of V is not necessary, since mutual information
is invariant under invertible transformations.
A. Diagonalization
Consider X¯ = Σ−1/2X X and Y¯ = Σ
−1/2
Y Y . This is defined
to mean that only the positive eigenvalues are inverted. The
zero eigenvalues remain zero. However, this is still a matrix
inverse i.e. X = Σ1/2X Σ
−1/2
X X with probability one. We have
ΣX¯ =
(
IrX 0
0 0d−rX
)
, (19)
ΣY¯ =
(
IrY 0
0 0d−rY
)
. (20)
Also, we have
ΣX¯Y¯ = Σ
−1/2
X ΣXY Σ
−1/2
Y =
(
AX,Y 0
0 0d−rX,d−rY
)
,
(21)
where AX,Y ∈ RrX×rY . By the singular value decomposition,
we have
AX,Y = BXΛBY , (22)
where Λ ∈ RrX×rY+ is diagonal and BX ∈ RrX×rX , BY ∈
R
rY ×rY are orthogonal matrices. Then with
X˜ =
(
BX 0
0 0d−rX
)
X¯, (23)
Y˜ =
(
BY 0
0 0d−rY
)
Y¯ , (24)
we have ΣX˜ = ΣX¯ , ΣY˜ = ΣY¯ and
ΣX˜Y˜ =
(
Λ 0
0 0d−rX,d−rY
)
, (25)
where the non-zero diagonal entries of Λ are {ρi}ri=1
(ρi > 0), the singular values of the correlation matrix
Σ
−1/2
X ΣXY Σ
−1/2
Y .
Thus, we have constructed invertible linear transformations
X 7→ X˜ and Y 7→ Y˜ such that ΣX˜ ,ΣY˜ and ΣX˜Y˜ are
diagonal. Since mutual information is invariant to invertible
transformations, it suffices to show that
arg min
P
V |X˜Y˜ :X˜−V−Y˜
(
λI(X˜ ;V ) + I(X˜, Y˜ ;V )
)
(26)
is Gaussian.
B. Achievability Proof
Let r := min(rX , rY ). Consider independent random vari-
ables V, Z1, Z2 ∼ N (0, Ir). Let Aλ = diag({aλ,i}ri=1) and
Bλ = diag({bλ,i}ri=1). Consider (0 ≤ aλ,i, bλ,i ≤ 1 for all i)
X˜:r =
√
AλV +
√
I −AλZ1 (27)
Y˜:r =
√
BλV +
√
I −BλZ2, (28)
with
√
aλ,ibλ,i = ρi, so that PX˜Y˜ is realized. It suffices
to generate the remaining (d − r) components of X˜ and
Y˜ independent of V . Note that we have X˜ − V − Y˜ and
(X˜, Y˜ ) ∼ PX˜Y˜ under the above construction.
Under this distribution, we have (since X˜i − Vi − Y˜i ∀i)
λI(X˜ ;V ) + I(X˜Y˜ ;V ) (29)
= λI(X˜:r;V ) + I(X˜:rY˜:r;V ) (30)
=
r∑
i=1
(
λI(X˜i;Vi) + I(X˜iY˜i;Vi)
)
(31)
=
r∑
i=1
(
(λ + 1)I(X˜i;Vi) + I(Y˜i;Vi)− I(X˜i; Y˜i)
)
(32)
=
r∑
i=1
(
1
2
log
1
(1− aλ,i)λ+1(1− bλ,i)
−
1
2
log
1
(1− ρ2i )
)
(33)
=
r∑
i=1
(
1
2
log
aλ,i
(1− aλ,i)λ+1(aλ,i − ρ2i )
−
1
2
log
1
(1− ρ2i )
)
.
(34)
Now, set
aλ,i =
λρ2i + ρi
√
λ2ρ2i + 4(λ+ 1)
2(λ+ 1)
(35)
to achieve (11)-(12). It is easy to check that ρ2i ≤ aλ,i ≤ 1,
which respects the correlation constraint
√
aλ,ibλ,i = ρi. Note
that a0,i = ρi, which recovers the construction of [25]. Also,
limλ→∞ aλ,i = ρ
2
i , which reflects the fact that Vi = Y˜i with
probability 1 as λ→∞.
C. Converse Proof
The following lemma shall be crucial in establishing the
optimality of our construction. This is essentially the Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality. In [25], the AM-GM inequality and the
orthogonality principle in optimal estimation were used in the
converse proof. This approach does not work here due to the
asymmetry introduced by the parameter λ.
Lemma 1. For unit variance random variables X,Y ∈ R and
any PV |X,Y such that X − V − Y , we have
ρ2 = E[XY ]2 ≤ E
[
E[X |V ]2
]
E
[
E[Y |V ]2
] (36)
Proof: By X−V −Y and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
we have
E[XY ]2 = EV [E[XY |V ]]
2 (37)
= EV [E[X |V ]E[Y |V ]]
2 (38)
≤ E[E[X |V ]2]E[E[Y |V ]2]. (39)
Consider any PV |XY such that X˜−V − Y˜ (so X˜i−V − Y˜i
holds for all i). Note that we don’t make any structural
assumptions on V here. Let DX˜i := E[(X˜i − E[X˜i|V ])
2]
and DY˜i := E[(Y˜i − E[Y˜i|V ])
2]. Using standard information-
theoretic inequalities, we have
λI(X˜ ;V ) + I(X˜Y˜ ;V ) (40)
≥ λI(X˜:r;V ) + I(X˜:rY˜:r;V ) (41)
= λ
r∑
i=1
I(X˜i;V |X˜
i−1) +
r∑
i=1
I(X˜iY˜i;V |X˜
i−1Y˜ i−1) (42)
= λ
r∑
i=1
I(X˜i;V, X˜
i−1) +
r∑
i=1
I(X˜iY˜i;V, X˜
i−1Y˜ i−1) (43)
≥
r∑
i=1
(
λI(X˜i;V ) + I(X˜iY˜i;V )
)
(44)
=
r∑
i=1
(
(λ+ 1)I(X˜i;V ) + I(Y˜i;V )− I(X˜i; Y˜i)
)
(45)
≥
r∑
i=1
(
(λ+ 1)I(X˜i;E[X˜i|V ]) + I(Y˜i;E[Y˜i|V ])− I(X˜i; Y˜i)
)
(46)
≥
r∑
i=1
(
(λ+ 1)RX˜i(DX˜i) +RY˜i(DY˜i)− I(X˜i; Y˜i)
)
(47)
=
r∑
i=1
(
1
2
log
1− ρ2i
Dλ+1
X˜i
DY˜i
)
, (48)
where (46) follows from the data-processing inequality and
(47) follows from the definition of the Gaussian rate-distortion
function RX(·) [31, Theorem 10.3.2].
Since X˜i − V − Y˜i holds for all i, using
DX˜i = E[(X˜i − E[X˜i|V ])
2] (49)
= E[X˜2i ]− E[E[X˜i|V ]
2] (50)
= 1− E[E[X˜i|V ]
2], (51)
and similarly
DY˜i = 1− E[E[Y˜i|V ]
2], (52)
we have from Lemma 1 that (recall that E[X˜iY˜i] = ρi)
ρ2i ≤ (1−DX˜i)(1−DY˜i) (53)
⇐⇒ ρ2i +DY˜i(1−DX˜i) ≤ (1−DX˜i) (54)
⇐⇒
ρ2i
1−DX˜i
+DY˜i ≤ 1 (55)
⇐⇒ DY˜i ≤ 1−
ρ2i
1−DX˜i
. (56)
Inserting (56) into (48), we find that minimizing (48) is
equivalent to
maximize Dλ+1
X˜i
(
1−
ρ2i
1−DX˜i
)
=: fλ(1 −DX˜i), (57)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, where
fλ(x) =
(1− x)λ+1(x− ρ2i )
x
, (58)
and the maximization is carried out over functions DX˜i(λ),
where DX˜i : R+ → [0, 1]. Note that DY˜i(λ) ≥ 0 and (56)
imply that 0 ≤ DX˜i(λ) ≤ 1−ρ
2
i ⇐⇒ ρ
2
i ≤ (1−DX˜i(λ)) ≤
1. In order to maximize the above expression, we set f ′λ(1−
DX˜i) = 0 to obtain
DX˜i(λ) = 1−
λρ2i + ρi
√
λ2ρ2i + 4(λ+ 1)
2(λ+ 1)
. (59)
Since f(ρ2i ) = f(1) = 0, f(x) > 0 for ρ2i < x < 1 and
f is smooth, this critical point must be the maximum. Since
the resulting value of Dλ+1
X˜i
DY˜i was achieved by the Gaussian
construction, we conclude that Gaussian auxiliaries suffice for
achieving the optimal rate frontier.
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